In a report that took longer to compile than British involvement in the war it assesses, the Chilcot Inquiry concluded that almost every element of Britain's decision to go to war in Iraq in 2003 was flawed. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein posed "no imminent threat" and could have been contained by other measures. Military action was not "a last resort," and the intelligence on which the decision to go to war was compromised or mistaken. And, despite that momentous decision to go to war, the military was woefully unprepared for what would follow invasion.

While the report is damning to the reputation of then-British Prime Minister Tony Blair, it does not say that he lied to the public or Parliament, broke the law or even acted in bad faith. Blair faced an incredibly difficult decision, one that forced him to balance his country's "special relationship" with the United States against the unknowns of war. Yet in that balancing act, he failed his country and the soldiers he sent to fight. The consequences of those decisions continue to plague his country and the world.

John Chilcot, a former privy councillor and distinguished civil servant, was appointed chair of a committee of inquiry by Prime Minister Gordon Brown to investigate Britain's involvement in Iraq from mid-2001 to July 2009. The inquiry was preceded by several other investigations, but all had been dismissed as insufficiently rigorous. Chilcot's inquiry was expected to take a little over a year, but elections, squabbles with Washington over what materials could be divulged, and the right of individuals mentioned in the report to respond, delayed its release until last week.