The Russian government made two bets when it sent troops into South Ossetia and Georgia last month. The first — that Russian forces could crush any opposition — was a pretty safe bet. While the Russian military has deteriorated significantly since the Cold War, it has more than enough firepower to defeat the armed forces of any former Soviet republics. The speed with which it defeated Georgian forces is proof enough of its enduring ability to crush tiny nations on its periphery.

The second bet had longer odds, but was still relatively safe: that the rest of the world would be unable to muster a unified response and that harsh words would substitute for substantive action. That calculation has also been vindicated. In the aftermath of the dismemberment of Georgia, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has claimed a "sphere of influence" in the world.

Conflict between Georgia and Russia was long in the making. Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili has provoked Moscow since he took office in 2004, and Western leaders, most notably those in the U.S., did not discourage him. The governments in Moscow and Tbilisi escalated their actions until Mr. Saakashvili decided to end once and for all the South Ossetian dream of an independent state. His rash attempt to resolve the problem by force gave Russia a pretext to send in its own troops. The result was the predictable crushing of the Georgian military, occupation of parts of Georgia, and recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.