LAS VEGAS -- The dispute between Washington and Tokyo over the fate of Army Sgt. Charles Jenkins, whom the United States accuses of defecting to North Korea some 40 years ago, is more than a case of American legalism vs. Japanese ad hoc policy and humanitarian instincts. The issue goes much deeper into how effectively a nation conducts its homeland security affairs. For half a century, Japanese leaders have relied on ambiguity, interpretation and private connections to get the business of government done, but this soft collusive approach to domestic security affairs is no longer effective or appropriate. In fact, it is severely damaging Japan's economic recovery.
The Jenkins' affair is just the tip of this homeland insecurity iceberg. It is no secret that behind closed doors, the United States and Japan have been at odds for years over bilateral differences in handling criminal behavior: the lack of cooperation between national crime agencies, conflicting rules for tax investigations, the sale by Japanese of U.S. military secrets to enemy nations, and the handling of foreign and domestic spies operating in Japan.
The implications of Japan's flawed domestic crime and security apparatus are also linked to much larger issues. International money laundering by Japan's crime syndicates is a major problem. Aum Shinrikyo was not taken seriously by the Japanese police, and this led to the death of Japanese. Until recently, loopholes in banking controls made Japan the largest source of illegal funds to North Korea. Al-Qaeda operatives and North Koreans find no trouble in using fake passports to enter Japan. Japan still has no law against espionage, and treason can only be punished in times of war. But as we know, Japan cannot officially go to war.