The inadequacies of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime become more evident each day. From Libya and Pakistan come recent revelations that a black market in nuclear materials has existed for years virtually under the nose of the world's nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and its associated regime need to be strengthened. More importantly, nations must understand that nuclear weapons do not increase their security. Here, the nuclear weapons states have a special role to play, yet their failure to disarm as mandated by the NPT undermines their call for restraint on the part of other governments.
The NPT calls the development of peaceful nuclear technologies an "inalienable right." To guarantee that right, the treaty embodies a tradeoff: In exchange for giving up ambitions to develop nuclear weapons, a government earns the right to advanced nuclear technologies. The area of greatest concern is technology related to enrichment and reprocessing, which enables a country to make its own fuel -- and the essential material for a nuclear bomb. Under the NPT "gentlemen's agreement," however, there is little -- apart from international censure -- to stop a government from cheating: getting the technology while pursuing a secret nuclear weapons program.
It has become embarrassingly clear in recent months that cheating is widespread. Both Iran and Libya have admitted to possessing clandestine nuclear programs. Iran has not conceded that it was trying to develop weapons. Libya did confess, but said its program had been terminated. Both cases underscored the inability of the nonproliferation regime to maintain tabs on suspect programs, as well as a thriving black market in nuclear materials and technology that spanned up to 15 countries. Apparently North Korea has also tapped this market.