WASHINGTON -- Even those who admire U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld rarely consider his diplomatic skills among his strongest suits. Capable of being charming and engaging in person, he tends to come across less well when sniping at allies across oceans over the chief foreign policy issues of the day. As such, it was surprising when the Bush administration let him run its study on overseas military basing almost single-handedly, without the significant involvement of Secretary of State Colin Powell's State Department or the National Security Council. Not only was Rumsfeld's Pentagon naturally in charge of the military aspects of the review, it was also given a dominant voice in its broader strategic aspects and diplomatic implementation.

This strange decision led to some big problems with a few key allies in the aftermath of the debate about whether to go to war against Iraqi President Saddam Hussein last winter. Since Rumsfeld's review reportedly proposed cutting forces in Germany and radically reshaping the U.S. presence in South Korea -- two countries that opposed U.S. policy on Iraq and had problems with the Bush administration more broadly -- few believed it any coincidence that Rumsfeld singled out these countries for major changes. The plan looked to many like punishment, pure and simple.

In South Korea in particular, it also looked like preparation for a possible application of Bush's preemption doctrine. The basic idea was to reposition American forces further south on the Peninsula -- where, some noted, they would not be within easy range of North Korean artillery that might be used to retaliate for any U.S. preemptive attack on North Korea's nuclear capabilities. Moreover, the policy was made by a man who did not make his first trip to Seoul during his tenure as secretary of defense until November 2003, and who has been widely suspected of harboring a preference for a much more aggressive approach toward North Korea than his own president has adopted.