As China's leaders discuss future policies and strategies at the summer resort of Beidaihe, future cross-strait strategy is high on their list of priorities. President Jiang Zemin has been roundly and openly criticized for mishandling events leading up to Chen Shui-bian's election as Taiwan's first non-Nationalist Party leader. Some, particularly within the Chinese military, think Jiang was too soft, but most feel he painted himself (and China) into a corner, which now makes it difficult to deal constructively with a surprisingly conciliatory Chen.

Chen has already made a series of unilateral concessions to Beijing. His list of "nos" includes no statement of independence, no referendum on Taiwan's desired status, no institutionalization of former President Lee Teng-hui's controversial "special state-to-state relations" stance, no change to Taiwan's constitution, no name change, no termination of the National Unification Council, and no abolishment of the National Unification Guidelines; all significant departures from previous Democratic Progressive Party positions. Chen has even flirted with various "one China" formulations, expressing a willingness "to embrace the spirit of 1992" (when both sides agreed to disagree over its definition).

This is about as far as Chen can realistically go, given his own political constraints and the domestic challenges that must remain among his top priorities. It is highly unlikely, in light of current attacks against Chen from members of his own party for being too soft on China, that he will utter the words that the mainland (unrealistically) demands to hear relating to one China . . . nor should he, at least not until Beijing shows some recognition and appreciation for how much Chen has already conceded.