In recent years, we have seen active debate on Japan's sanctions-based diplomacy. Discussions focused on the justifications for and effects of sanctions, as well as changes in the balance of power resulting from the lifting of such measures. The lifting of sanctions against North Korea Dec. 14 renewed the debate.
Japan implemented four sanctions following North Korea's test-firing of a Taepodong missile over Japan August 1998. The measures consisted of a freeze on contributions to a multinational consortium for providing nuclear-power reactors to North Korea, suspension of charter flights, a ban on food aid and suspension of bilateral diplomatic normalization talks. The action might have appeared drastic, but experts doubted the effectiveness of the sanctions.
The freeze on Japanese contributions to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization should not have been used to punish Pyongyang for the missile test. KEDO was designed to halt North Korea's nuclear-arms development in exchange for nuclear reactors. Refusal to finance KEDO could have been construed as implicit approval of North Korea's nuclear-arms development. Under U.S. and South Korean pressure, Japan was forced to lift the freeze less than two months after announcing it.
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