Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi has his "omiyage" for U.S. President Bill Clinton. Following Monday night's approval of three bills to implement the updated Japan-U.S. defense guidelines by a special Lower House committee, the full Lower House approved them Tuesday, and Mr. Obuchi will be able to tell the president that he has delivered on his promise to rejuvenate the alliance when they meet in Washington next week. The Upper House will not vote on the legislation until later next month, but passage is virtually assured. The government considers the vote a triumph: a victory for the Liberal Democratic Party and its political allies, and a vote of confidence for the bilateral security alliance.

A more balanced assessment is in order, however, and it is not nearly as glowing as the government would claim. Yes, the legislation has been passed, but once again an opportunity to bring the Japanese public into the defense debate has been squandered. Debate in the Diet was perfunctory, despite the many days spent on it. Critical questions about the scope and effective applicability of the guidelines remain unanswered. More importantly, the critical bargaining was done outside the Diet. Three parties -- the LDP, the Liberal Party and New Komeito -- resorted once again to the back-room deal-making that has been the hallmark of LDP rule. Compromises were struck, and the resulting legislation seems to be even more vague than it was before.

Earlier this month, we asked two key questions: What are the precise circumstances that would lead Japan to put its armed forces in harm's way? And must the government seek Diet approval before mobilizing the Self-Defense Forces? We, along with the rest of the country, are still waiting for clear answers. A certain level of ambiguity is understandable: It enhances deterrence and permits military and diplomatic flexibility. Nonetheless, the Constitution puts very definite limits on the ways that Japan may resort to the use of force. Those limits must be respected.