China's relations with the United States are at their lowest point since the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996. Beijing has a lengthening list of grievances against Washington: harsh criticism in the State Department's annual human-rights report and the prospect of a resolution censoring Chinese behavior at the annual United Nations human-rights meeting coming up soon in Geneva; claims that China is stealing U.S. nuclear secrets; the cancellation of the sale of a communications satellite to a Chinese-led consortium; lack of progress in talks for admission into the World Trade Organization. But the most important complaint against the U.S. concerns Washington's pursuit of a theater missile defense program and the Clinton administration's apparent willingness to share that technology with Taiwan.

In recent weeks, senior Chinese officials have warned that extending the TMD shield to the island would be "the last straw" in the deteriorating relationship, and would have serious consequences. One official obliquely noted that the Chinese people "would be willing to die" to protect the country's dignity and sovereignty. The Chinese response is genuine: China's indivisibility, and the fact that Taiwan is considered an integral part of the nation, is perhaps the only topic upon which all Chinese agree. But the existence of such fears does not make Beijing's over-reaction correct. The deployment of TMD is by no means assured, nor is its extension to Taiwan. If the Chinese want to minimize the chances of both, there are far more constructive policies they can adopt. Threats are the worst possible approach.

China fears TMD since it threatens to neutralize its nuclear arsenal, the only weapon in the Chinese armory that its Asian neighbors do not possess. Chinese strategists also worry that the U.S. is turning again to the Reagan-era strategy that bankrupted the Soviet Union: using the prospect of a Star Wars-style missile defense system to force China to spend itself into ruin.