STRATEGIC ASIA: Power and Purpose 2001-02, edited by Richard J. Ellings and Aaron Friedberg. Seattle, Wash., National Bureau of Asian Research, 2001, 378 pp., $19.95 (paper)

Power is the currency of international relations. Incredibly, we still aren't exactly sure what "power" is, how it is exercised and who has it. Take the United States. It has a military arsenal, international influence and a global reach, all of which are unparalleled in human history. But the U.S. has been put on the defensive by a minuscule group of terrorists operating out of ATM machines and Internet cafes.

A fair number of people in Washington feel threatened by North Korea, a country on the verge of collapse that has no known arsenal of nuclear weapons and relies on international aid to avoid mass starvation. Finally, for all its power, influence and reach, the U.S. has been forced time and time again to accommodate other much less powerful nations to achieve goals it deems necessary for its national security. These anomalies underline the difficulties in making strategy. This is more art than science, and there is ample room for disagreement on just about every conclusion, no matter how trivial or important.

As the subtitle to this new regional assessment by the National Bureau of Asian Research makes clear, meaningful analysis must look at both power and purpose. The first is considerably easier to understand -- apart from the difficulties of measuring "comprehensive power," which includes economic and cultural influence -- just add up the planes, ships, soldiers and other elements of a nation's arsenal. That is only half the equation, though. Purpose is just as critical and divining that particular mystery is, well, a mysterious process. The essence of politics is compromise, and the possible on any given day is a product of the particular circumstances at that time. Who would have thought a year ago that Japanese warships would be on station in the Indian Ocean?