In many ways, the remarkable thing about India's nuclear bomb test on May 11, 1998 is not that it occurred, but that it didn't happen sooner. Ever since India detonated its first "peaceful nuclear explosion" at the Pokhran test site in 1974, analysts had said that a real bomb was just around the corner. But for a variety of reasons, it never materialized.
In fact, as George Perkovich argues in this extraordinary study -- an exhaustive effort that is sure to be the definitive work on the subject -- India's nuclear program confounds the experts on just about every count. "India's Nuclear Bomb" is a fascinating explanation of the reasons for these misunderstandings and the consequences that flow from them. It should be required reading for anyone who wants to understand nuclear proliferation.
As history, "India's Nuclear Bomb" is hard to beat. It covers the entire history of the country's nuclear-development program, with interviews from key participants in politics and the scientific community. They are supplemented with news and ample commentary from Indian newspapers. India's policies are framed within an international context: relations with Pakistan, China, the Soviet Union and the United States. It is an exemplary effort.