Until about two months ago, discussion of economic coercion invariably focused on Beijing’s readiness to use its substantial leverage to bend trade partners to its will. No longer. Since early November, the conversation has shifted. Now virtually all attention is on the United States given Donald Trump’s love of tariffs and his eagerness to use them to promote his policy priorities.
His threats last Sunday to impose tariffs on Colombia after that country refused to accept U.S. deportees are proof that this isn’t an abstract or hypothetical concern. Trump’s logic (like that of Beijing) is compelling: Big country, big economy, big stick. Given the speed with which Colombia backed down, it’s hard to argue against the tactic. In fact, however, economic coercion doesn’t always work like that.
There is no agreed definition of economic coercion under international law; like pornography, we know it when we see it. And there has been a lot to study. The U.S. has deployed the tool almost since its founding. During Thomas Jefferson’s presidency, the country passed the Embargo Act of 1807 to punish Britain and France for harassing U.S. ships.
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